reading Flyvberg and Richardson in Allmendinger and Tewdwr-Jones.  highlighting every second paragraph! a few thoughts:

• triads may be things to strive for: prevents/counters the dichotomous/oppositional thinking and choices
• along these lines, then: rational, comprehensive; intuitive, personal; reasoned, situational. or are these thesis, antithesis, synthesis? and if not, how do the three-way thing and dialectic fit together?do each of the three i've noted (which could definitely use refinement) each have their own thesis, antithesis, synthesis?  how many different qualities can 'rational' be contrasted to?[hmmm...  opositional thinking to get away from oppositional thinking...? 
• perhaps Flyvberg's 'dark side'...
• some discussion around the value/disvalue of ideals (p57).  F and R note that some planners "use Habermas's ideals as a reference point, and to work backwards.  The Habermasian ideal is accepted by many planning theorists as being out of reach, so the theory is applied in a different way, as a benchmark... and thereby guiding action to remove some of these distortions (57).    but this seems the same thing that i was talking about regarding rational comprehensive as an ideal.  if one/all agree that the ideal is a place that will not be reached, the question is whether one/all should be striving for it or should one/all be striving to reach something more achievable?  or is this just, effectively, replacement of one (higher) ideal for a (lower) one?  can we escape from ideals?  if the notion is that there might be/can be/should be something 'better' does this not point to an ideal? or does it just point to something different, or something better i.e. not an ideal, just not as bad as present situation/circumstances.  a more evolutionary notion perhaps; where the process of continual change and evolution- an the fundamental impossibility of an 'ideal' -  is acknowledged.  evaluations are made against current situations, with actions chosen to move in particular directions taken as 'better' in some way, not because it will make progress towards a goal, but because it will be 'better' than current.  but does this negate longer term planning?  perhaps, but the temporal dimension of 'current' could be altered to include considerable variety, including longer ones.  this might, then, have a buddist, taoist flavour to it; the sens of thiengs/people just being, instead of trying to get somewhere... does this preclude the very practice of planning?  well, i dont thinnk we can get rid of planning that easily.  it probably relates to the time frame - and to what 'planning' is...
• and of course this idealized vs. non-idealized(pragmatic) approach is yet another dichotomy [consider what appropriate term is here...].  what is the synthesis or third way? or how 'bout alphabetical way instead? since someone i read recently drew connections betwee tht third way and synthesis (i think)

The Nietzschean insight that historically morality has typically been established by immoral means would hold true for Habermas's morality, too.  Power is needed to limit power.  Even to understand how publicness can be established we need to think in terms of conflict and power.  There is no way around it.  It is a basic condition for understanding issues of exclusion and inclusion, and for understanding planning (Flyvberg and Richardson 2002: 49)

If the goal of planning theorists is to create a planning which is closer to Habermas's ideal society - free from domination, more democratic, a strong civil society - then the first task is not to understand the utopia of communicative rationality, but to understand the realities of power. And it is here that the work of Michel Foucault, who has tried to develop such an understanding, becomes relevant (Flyvberg and Richardson 2002: 49).